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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Human Tissue Act 2004 (hereafter the 2004 Act), which
(inter alia) consolidated the law on organ donation and repealed
earlier legislation, came into effect in England, Wales, and Northern
Ireland on 1 September 2006.
1 The Human Tissue Authority
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Farrell,DavidPrice,andthetwoanonymousreviewersfortheirhelpfulcomments.
1 The Human Tissue Act 2004 (the 2004 Act) is now the primary legislation
regulating transplantation in those countries. The Act does not apply in Scot-
land (save for s 45, prohibiting the taking and analysis of DNA samples
without consent). Separate legislation applies in Scotland; see the Human
Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006. The 2004 Act repeals and replaces the Human
Tissue Act 1961, the Anatomy Act 1984 and the Human Organ Transplant
Act 1989. The authorisation of activities for scheduled purposes is outlined
in s 1 of the 2004 Act. It covers seven scheduled purposes requiring general
consent, one of which is transplantation. Scheduled purposes requiring
general consent are outlined in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Act ,http://
www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/40030--e.htm#sch1..
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2 the regulatory body established by the 2004 Act, and the
NHS Blood and Transplant Organ Donation and Transplantation
Directorate (NHSBT ODT), formerly known as UK Transplant
(UKT),
3 the national organ allocation body, continue to follow a
long-established policy of accepting deceased donor organ donations
only on an undirected, or ‘unconditional’ basis.
4 The ‘central prin-
ciple’ of organ allocation from deceased donors is that they must go
to the person who is most in need and has the best match with the
donor—a donor can neither direct the organ to a speciﬁc recipient
nor impose conditions as to who shall be chosen; all such restrictions
may be ignored as invalid.
5
This policy did not come into being with the 2004 Act, but had
already been generally adhered to in the case of deceased organ
donations, since about the time of the Human Tissue Act 1961 (repealed
by the 2004 Act). Although it does not appear to have been clearly
expressed until relatively recently, it has been widely applied, with
almost universal support of organ donation and transplant centres (at
least as far as the exchange of organs between centres is concerned)
and is usually regarded as legally binding.
6
The ethical basis underpinning deceased organ donation allocation
is one of impartial justice. It is in this context that issues of fairness
and efﬁciency in allocation arise.
7 Some have remarked that organs
are public resources to be distributed by relevant agencies on behalf
of the state.
8 Consequentialists, who believe that an action should
2 The HTAwas set up under the Human Tissue Act 2004. It is charged with reg-
ulating the removal, storage, use, and disposal of human bodies, organs, and
tissue from the living and deceased (excluding gametes and embryos).
3 The NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT, ,www.nhsbt.nhs.org.) Organ
Donation and Transplant Directorate (NHSBT ODT) is now the body respon-
sible for deceased donororgan allocation in the UK. It replaced UK Transplant
(UKT, ,www.uktransplant.org.uk.), the body formerly responsible for
deceased donor organ allocation in the UK, in 2009.
4 Human Tissue Authority statement on directed donation of organs after
death. Issue date 14 April 2008.
5 Conditional donation is when a donor organ (or organs) is (are) offered to (or
possibly withheld from) a speciﬁc class of recipient. Directed donation is when
a donor organ (or organs) is (are) directed to a speciﬁc person, or a nominated
individual is given priority. For a recent deﬁnition, distinction, and ethical dis-
cussion, see ML Volk and PA Ubel, ‘A Gift of Life: Ethical and Practical
Problems with Conditional and Directed Donation’ (2008) 85(11) Transplan-
tation 1542–1544.
6 Report of the Panel, An Investigation into Conditional Organ Donation
(Department of Health 2000). The inquiry conclusions are outlined in L
Beecham, ‘Donors and Relatives Must Place No Conditions on Organ Use’
(2000) 320 BMJ 534.
7 For a discussion, see AJ Cronin and D Price, ‘Directed Organ Donation: Is the
Donor the Owner?’ (2008) 3 Clinical Ethics 127–131.
8 See e.g. Report of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation, Department of
Health & Human Services, 1986, p 77 and Congress Resolution 8 in
276 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2010]be judged in terms of the consequences that follow from it, and will
support whatever action has the greatest beneﬁt for the greatest
number,
9 may provide us with good and prudential reasons for sup-
porting a system of organ donation in which organs from the deceased
are considered public goods automatically available for transplan-
tation, directly imported into an impartial equitable system of organ
allocation.
10 Any refusal to donate costs lives and it is undoubtedly
the case that thousands of individuals have needlessly died an
untimely death waiting for a transplant.
11 But if we endorse the con-
sequentialist position and consider that deceased donor organs are a
public resource or community ‘property’ to be allocated according
to agreed jurisdictional policies, then we must be able to provide an
explanation as to from where such dispositional authority and
property rights are derived. Moreover, the concept of human body
parts as property requires a consideration of what this may imply
for individual donor ownership, as well as for both directed and con-
ditional donation.
12
In marked contrast, the rationale underpinning living organ
donation is donor autonomy and respect for an individual’s wishes
and informed decision. At their outset, living donor transplant pro-
grammes emphasised speciﬁcally directed donation. An individual was
entitled to donate to another individual in whom he, or she, had a
special interest, a brother say. Kluge, for instance, argued that donations
by living persons ‘create and sustain intimate personal relationships’
and, in particular, family ties, and constitute exceptions to the general
rules of impartial allocation.
13 Non-directed donation was to some
extent mistrusted as it did not involve the personal bond considered
necessary to overcome the reluctance of doctors to inﬂict surgical
injury on one person for the beneﬁt of another. As late as 1986, the
UK medical opinion regarded all living donation as justiﬁable only in
exceptional circumstances.
14 However, the increasingly good outcome
of living donor transplantation, not only to close genetic relatives but
W Land and J Dossetor (eds), Organ Replacement Therapy: Ethics, Justice,
Commerce (Springer, Berlin 1991) 556.
9 See generally J Glover (ed), Utilitarianism and Its Critics (Macmillan,
London, 1990).
10 J Harris, ‘Organ Procurement: Dead Interests, Living Needs: Cadaver Organs
Should Be Automatically Available’ (2003) 29 JME 130–134.
11 Harris (n 10). See also AJ Cronin, ‘Equitable Accessto Organs’ in W Weimar,
MA Bos, JJ Busschbach (eds), The Ethical, Legal and Psychological Aspects
of Organ Transplantation (Pabst Publishers, Lengerich, 2008) 99–110.
12 Cronin and Price (n 7).
13 EH Kluge, ‘Designated Organ Donation: Private Choice in Social Context’
(1989) 19 Hastings Center Report 10.
14 RA Sells, RWG Johnson and J Hutchinson, ‘Recommendations on the Use of
Living Donors in the UK’ (1986) 293 BMJ 257–258.
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15 combined with the ever-increasing
demand for organs, made living donor organ transplantation an
altogether more attractive model and enhanced its ethical acceptability.
In the UK, it remains the case that most living donations are
directed.
16 They usually involve a healthy person donating an organ
(often a kidney) or part organ (for example, the liver or lung lobe) to
a speciﬁc recipient who is related to the donor either genetically or
emotionally.
17 Although now regulated by section 33 of the 2004 Act,
directed donations between close family members, including spouses,
are always lawful, provided that the HTA is satisﬁed that no element
of reward or coercion exists—they currently account for over one-third
of all annual kidney transplants.
18
Thus, so it seems, two parallel donation/allocation regimes have
evolved and are in operation with (in essence) an impartial justice
rationale governing deceased donation and a partial autonomy-driven
rationale underpinning living donation. This is reﬂected in other juris-
dictions.
19 The overall picture, however, is less straightforward than it
15 PI Terasaki and others, ‘High Survival Rates of Kidney Transplants from
Spousal and Living Unrelated Donors’ (1995) 333 NEJM 333–336.
16 The requirements for living donor transplantation are set out in the 2004 Act s
33–34 and in the Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity
to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006 ss 9–14 These regulations
are detailed at ,www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/20061659.htm.. The Human
Tissue Act 2004, Revised Code of Practice 2 ‘Donation of Solid Organs
for Transplantation’ (September 2009) Section para 26 outlines the types
of living organ donation that may take place. ,http://www.hta.gov.uk/
legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice/code2donationoforgans.
cfm?FaArea1=customwidgets.content_view_1&cit_id=673&cit_parent_
cit_id=669.. In 2008–2009, out of a total of 927 live kidney donations, 16
were paired or pooled and 15 altruistic non-directed. See Transplant Activity
in the UK, 2008–2009 Table 3.1. See the NHSBT and UKT Transplant
Report 2009. ,www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/statistics/transplant_activity_
report/current_activity_reports/ukt/transplant_activity_uk_2008-2009.pdf..
17 A genetically related donation is one in which the potential donor is a blood
relative of the potential recipient. An emotionally related donation is one in
which the potential donor has a personal relationship with the potential reci-
pient, for example, spouse, partner, or close friend.
18 Transplant Activity in the UK, 2008–2009, Table 3.1. See the NHSBT and
UKT Transplant Report 2009. ,www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/statistics/
transplant_activity_report/current_activity_reports/ukt/transplant_activity_
uk_2008-2009.pdf..
19 D Price, ‘Legal Systems for Organ Distribution in Europe: Justice in Allo-
cation’ in W Weimar, MA Bos, JJ Busschbach (eds), The Ethical, Legal
and Psychological Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Pabst Publishers, Len-
gerich, 2008) 163–174. See for example, the applicable laws in Poland and
the Czech Republic, and the evolution of policies of the relevant national
and supranational organ allocation agencies. See also Council of Europe
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, 2002,
Strasbourg, Article 3.
278 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2010]might at ﬁrst appear. Anonymous ‘altruistic’ donation
20 is permitted by
strangers in the UK under the 2004 Act, subject to HTA approval. Under
the established scheme, such donations are not allowed to be directed.
Rather, organs are allocated to the most suitable candidate waiting on
the national transplant list. The absence of any pre-existing relationship
and ‘spillover’ into the province of the deceased donorallocation scheme
apparently requires that the principle of impartial justice and equity
govern the distribution rather than the dispositional powers of individ-
ual donors.
21 ‘Paired’ and ‘pooled’ donations
22 are also permitted,
subject to HTA approval. In this instance, donors and recipients are
arranged in pairs or pools and placed in a ‘matching run’.
23 Paired or
pooled donor organs (usually kidneys) are then allocated or ‘swapped’
between them in such a way as to maximise the tissue compatibility
(and therefore also outcome). In paired and pooled donation, the
exchanging pairs are not required to be mutually acquainted. In fact,
in most (if not all) cases of paired or pooled exchange, the transplant
recipient is unknown to the donor.
Both non-directed altruistic and paired living donor transplants were
ﬁrst developed in the USA as a means of increasing the availability of
donor organs for transplantation
24 and of overcoming the inability of
20 ,www.hta.gov.uk/transplantation/organ_donation/altruistic_donation.cfm..
A living person who has never met the possible recipient may become an organ
donor. According to NHSBT transplant activity reports, between July 2007
and March 2009 there were twenty-one non-directed altruistic living donor
transplants. ,www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/statistics/transplant_activity_
report/current_activity_reports/ukt/transplant_activity_uk_2008-2009.pdf..
21 Cronin and Price (n 7).
22 ,www.hta.gov.uk/transplantation/organ_donation/
paired_and_pooled_donation.cfm.. Paired donation and transplantation is
possible when a potential donor is unable to donate directly to his/her rela-
tive, spouse, or friend, but can donate to an unknown person (also a potential
transplant recipient) whose relative, spouse, or friend can, in exchange,
donate to the original patient. In paired exchange, then, an incompatible
living donor and recipient ‘pair’ can ‘swap’ organs with another ‘pair’ in
the same situation. If more than two living donors and two recipients are
involved in the swap and more than one exchange takes place, it is called
‘pooled donation’. See also The Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who
Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006 SI 2006 No.
1659 and the Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 2, Donation of
Solid Organs for Transplantation, 2009, at paras 26.
23 A ‘matching run’ refers to a series of tests performed to identify tissue com-
patibility between organ donors and potential transplant recipients. In the
UK, ‘matching runs’ are currently performed 3 monthly; however, matching
runs will be carried out at intervals determined by the rate at which incom-
patible couples join the paired donation list. For further details, see ,http://
www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/about_transplants/organ_allocation/kidney_
(renal)/living_donation/paired_donation_matching_scheme.jsp..
24 A Matas and others, ‘Non-directed Donation of Kidneys from Living Donors’
(2000) 343 NEJM 433–436.
Med. L. Rev. Directed Deceased Donor Organ Donation 279a potential living donor to donate a kidney to a speciﬁed recipient (e.g. a
spouse), due to the presence of tissue incompatibility.
25 Non-directed
altruistic and paired living donor transplants were ﬁrst performed in
the UK by virtue of section 33(3) of the 2004 Act. By regulations
made under it, this section’s general restriction of living donation does
not apply where the HTA is satisﬁed (i) that no reward has been, or is
to be, given and (ii) that other conditions speciﬁed in the regulations
are satisﬁed—none of which prohibit paired or altruistic non-directed
donations. It has been claimed that the 2004 Act changed the law to
allow these advances in donation.
26 But, in our opinion, they would
have been equally possible under the Human Organ Transplant Act
1989 (hereafter the HOT Act), which ﬁrst restricted living donation.
Its text was almost identical to that of the 2004 Act and contained
nothing either in the main statute
27 or in its regulations to prevent
them; only payment and coercion were speciﬁcally forbidden.
28 Never-
theless, during the 17 years of the HOT Act, the Unrelated Live Trans-
plants Regulatory Authority (ULTRA), the HTA’s predecessor,
discouraged applications for any of these non-directed donations. This
was criticised,
29 but not challenged. In retrospect, we consider that
ULTRA underestimated and failed to exercise its authority in this
respect
30 and thus acted as a brake on a relatively small
31 but, for indi-
vidual patients, important advance in clinical transplantation.
32
In considering the ethical principles which in practice are applied by
the regulatory authority to both deceased and living donor transplan-
tation, and highlighting ‘non-directed altruistic’, and paired or pooled
living donor transplant schemes, we can see that there is incongruity
in the current position. For, so it seems, the situation is as follows.
Although we are allowed to decide for ourselves whether or not we
25 FL Delmonico, ‘Exchanging Kidneys: Advances in Living Donor Transplan-
tation’ (2004) 350 NEJM 1812.
26 AR Weale and PA Lear, ‘Organ Transplantation and the Human Tissue Act –
Changes in the Law May Have a Positive Impact on Organ Donation’ (2007)
83 Postgrad Med J 141–142. The authors comment: (a) ...‘the Act provides
a framework by which (paired transplants) can occur both legally and ethi-
cally; and (b) ‘Non-directed donation will ...be made legal by the Act’.
27 Human Organ Transplant Act 1989 s 2(3).
28 Human Organ Transplant (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 s 3 (Statu-
tory Instrument 1989 SI No. 2480).
29 S Chowdhry and others, ‘Unrelated Living Organ Donation: ULTRA Needs
to Go’ (2003) 29 JME 169–170.
30 This could have been examined by judicial review.
31 WH Marks and others, ‘Organ Donation and Utilization, 1995–2004: Enter-
ing the Collaborative Era’ (2006) 6 Am J Transplant 1101–1110. In 2004, 88
out of 2343 living unrelated donors in the USA were non-directed.
32 The Human Tissue Act 2004 s 33(4) does provide for a mechanism for
‘reconsideration’ of the HTA’s decisions with respect to living donation.
280 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2010]want to be organ donors upon our death, in the event that we do, we
cannot attach any condition to our ‘gift’ to society or specify a particular
recipient, even if this is a person with whom we have a personal relation-
ship. Instead, somehow or another, our donation slips straight into the
net of public resource and impartial allocation. Nevertheless, once our
consent is established, the donation can proceed without further regu-
lation. If, on the other hand, we are alive when we donate, we may
then legitimately direct our donation (our gift) to a speciﬁed person
with whom we do hold a relationship of some kind or another. In
fact, provided our living donation occurs in the context of a relationship,
we can even have our donation directed on our behalf to a stranger and
in return we will reap the beneﬁt of seeing the person with whom we
have a relationship receive a similar reciprocal gift. If, however, our
living donation is not in the context of a pre-existing relationship of
some kind or another, we cannot legitimately direct the very same
donation (or gift) to a speciﬁed stranger, but must instead make an
unconditional donation.
33 Furthermore, regardless of whether living
donations are directed or non-directed, living donor consent, though
necessary, is not sufﬁcient to ensure donation but (unlike the consent
of an individual who wishes to become a deceased donor) must ﬁrst
pass the scrutiny of the regulatory body (the HTA). Can we really con-
sider that there are two allocation schemes working in parallel when the
outcomes can be so incongruous?
34
Directed and conditional donations challenge the traditional model of
deceased donor organ allocation based on equityand impartial justice in
a powerful and striking way.
35 We might agree that allowing for such
restrictions will inevitably compromise the principle that organs from
deceased donors should be distributed according to a system of impar-
tial justice and equity, with an emphasis upon those with the greatest
medical need, in speciﬁc instances. But if we continue to accede to a
model of ‘appropriate consent’
36 or ‘authorisation’,
37 both afforded
primacy in the 2004 Act and the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006
respectively, as the basis upon which deceased donor organs become
available for transplantation, then we must provide good reason as to
33 Cronin and Price (n 7).
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 The law protects individuals’ rights to control the use of their bodies for
medical purposes. See generally J Herring, ‘Crimes Against the Dead’ in B
Brooks-Gordon and others (eds), Death Rites and Rights (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 2007) 219–239. It is by virtue of this right that the Human Tissue
Act 2004 empowers an individual to appropriately say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to
(consent or refuse) organ donation. See Human Tissue Act 2004, s 3.
37 Ibid. The Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 uses the term ‘authorisation’.
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deceased donors placing restrictions or conditions upon such authoris-
ation before their death. In particular, if the context of a relationship
merits such importance and, as would appear to be the case, gives legiti-
macy to the directedness of one’s donation, why should deceased
donations, to family members say, not also be acceptable?
Both unrelated and related living donors have lost some of their
former autonomy, as all living donations now require prior authoris-
ation by a statutory body (the HTA) to exclude the presence of
reward or coercion.
38 This was largely brought about following the
unexpected and unwelcome emergence of organ trafﬁcking,
39 despite
being banned in the UK since 1989.
40 In the case of deceased donation,
the 2004 Act now requires that ‘appropriate consent’ must be estab-
lished in all cases of organ removal for transplantation,
41 rather than
the mere absence of objection which sufﬁced to conﬁrm legality under
earlier legislation.
42 In effect, therefore, both living and deceased
donation now always require the oversight of a statutory body. The
advantage of statutory regulatory authorities is that they ensure
uniform donation practice throughout the country, and to some
extent facilitate it. The disadvantage is that these authorities, especially
if they have the power to disallow donations, either by law or in prac-
tice, may, if unchallenged in the courts, misinterpret the law by applying
their own ethical concepts beyond the limits which the law allows. In
this paper, we contend that the acceptance of the ‘central principle’ of
unconditional deceased donor organ donation as legally binding, or
close to legally binding, rather than as an operational policy, is just
such a misinterpretation, and seek to demonstrate not only that directed
and conditional deceased donor organ donations are not illegal per se,
but also that to overrule an individual’s request (or attempt to place a
condition upon a donation) may conﬂict in law with the principle of
‘appropriate consent’ considered by many to be the central fundamental
tenet and ‘golden thread’ of the 2004 Act. Moreover, we suggest that
allocating organs as though they were donated without restriction
may carry a risk of criminal liability for local transplant teams,
38 Human Tissue Act 2004 s 33.
39 In the UK, Dr Raymond Crockett was struck off the medical register by the
General Medical Council in May 1990. He was found guilty of procuring
human organs from living donors in exchange for money, as part of a
‘kidneys for sale’ scam. Organs from four Turkish patients were transplanted
into private patients at the Wellington Humana Hospital in St John’s Wood,
London. ,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/937204.stm..
40 Human Organ Transplants (HOT) Act 1989 s 1; now replaced by the Human
Tissue Act 2004 s 32.
41 Human Tissue Act 2004 s 3.
42 Human Tissue Act 1961 s 1(2)(a).
282 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2010]NHSBT ODT, and even the HTA itself. Although the HTA is free to
pursue an unconditional policy for the acceptance of organs through
ODT, this body has no enforceable ‘monopoly’
43 over deceased organ
donation.
44 Thus, so it seems, both directed and conditional deceased
donor organ donations may lawfully be performed without its partici-
pation, provided that they comply with the 2004 Act and are not
illegal for any other reason.
The clash between individual authorisation and public beneﬁt was
brought to the fore in the ‘Ashworth Affair’ of 2008, which thus forms a
useful starting point for an analysis of the relationship between underlying
ethical principles, regulatory policy, and the actual law of organ donation.
II. THE ASHWORTH AFFAIR
In April 2008, press reports of an attempted directed deceased donor
organ donation between close relations led to controversy.
45 The
donor, Laura Ashworth, a 21-year-old woman, had allegedly wished
to donate one of her kidneys to her mother, Rachel Leake, who had end-
stage renal failure and was at that time on haemodialysis. However, at
the time of her death, she had not begun the formal process of becoming
a ‘living donor’. UKT
46 referred the matter to the HTA whose response
(in an ofﬁcial statement explaining its decision) was unequivocal:
The central principle of matching and allocating organs from the
deceased’, it stated, ‘is that they are allocated to the person on the
waiting list who is most in need and who is the best matched with the
donor. This is regardless of gender, race, religion oranyother factor.
47
The inﬂexibility of such a policy has been criticised, for reasons which
became clear in this case.
48 If Laura had gone through the formal
process of living donation and still been alive, the HTAwould have con-
sidered it legitimate for her to direct the donation of one of her kidneys
to her mother subject to its approval, which there would have been no
43 In contrast with most other scheduled activities under the 2004 Act, no
licence is required to remove material for transplantation. In contrast with
medium to longer term therapeutic tissue banking, no licence is required
for storage of organs for transplantation either.
44 This is in contrast to its counterpart in the USA. The Organ Procurement
Transplant Network (OPTN).
45 ,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/7344205.stm..
46 UK Transplant (UKT, ,www.uktransplant.org.uk.) was the body respon-
sible for deceased donor organ allocation in the UK at the time of the ‘Ash-
worth Affair’.
47 Human Tissue Authority statement on directed donation of organs after
death. Issue dated 14 April 2008.
48 TM Wilkinson, ‘What’s not Wrong with Conditional Organ Donation?’
(2003) 29 JME 163–164.
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The HTA, however, explained that it was bound by the central principle
of its existing rules regarding deceased donation. It stated:
In line with this central principle, a person cannot choose to whom
their organ can be given when they die; nor can their family.
However, the HTA recognizes that there may be exceptional cir-
cumstances where this rule might be reconsidered, but the impor-
tance of maintaining the central principle means that such
exceptional situations would need to be considered with the great-
est care before any part of the consent rules were to be changed.
49
The statement went on to say that soundings would be taken from
suitable bodies as to whether the rules should be changed to allow
donation in such exceptional circumstances. But until that had been
done, ‘there should be no change in the current system of allocating
an organ according to need’.
50
Inthecaseunderdiscussion,therequesttodirectdonationofoneofthe
deceased’s kidneys to her mother was not upheld
51 and the organs were
distributed through UKT, according to the central principle. Although
clinical factors may have precluded the possibility of complying with
the alleged wish of the donor in any event, the HTA’s statement makes
it clear that, even if clinically practicable, her direction would have
been disregarded. This authoritative statement makes several assump-
tions about the legal status of deceased donations under the 2004 Act:
(1) all deceased donations must be unconditional,
(2) any restrictions attaching to donations may be lawfully set aside and
the donations treated as unconditional.
52
49 Human Tissue authority statement (n 47).
50 Ibid.
51 The Ashworth case contrasts well with a case referred to by Sir Roy Calne in
his autobiography The Ultimate Gift (Headline Book Publishing, 1998) of a
daughter (Patti) who was permitted to provide a heart to her father (Chester
Szuber) after her death in Michigan, USA, in 1994. Patti was killed in a car
accident. She had a donor card and there was general agreement that she
would have wanted to have donated to her father. The donation was
allowed by virtue of discretionary powers expressly vested in OPTN—see
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 42 121.4 and 121.8, 2005.
52 For a defence of this assumption, see A Maclean, ‘Organ Donation, Racism
and the Race Relations Act’ (1999) 149 NLJ 1250–1252. Alasdair Maclean
argues that whether it is only the conditions or the ‘gift’ as a whole that is
rendered void depends on whether the conditions are precedent or sub-
sequent to the ‘gift’. He maintains that, in the context of deceased donor
organ donation, these are conditions subsequent and that it would be
lawful to accept the ‘gift’ and ignore the illegitimate pre-conditions in all
cases. We consider Maclean’s argument in more detail below.
284 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2010](3) all deceased donations in the UK must be allocated through UK
Transplant, now NHSBT ODT, the national allocation body, in
accordance with the central principle of the HTA.
InMarch 2010, as promised,a policy documenton ‘Requested Allocation
of a Deceased Donor Organ’ was released.
53 Its most important function
is to reiterate and reinforce the two ‘overarching’ principles of uncondi-
tionality and equitable treatment for all based on clinical need. Subject
to these, however, the document sets out the circumstances in which a
request for speciﬁc allocation may be considered. These include the
death of an intended living donor and other exceptional cases in which
an organ from a deceased donor might beneﬁt a close family member
or friend. Implementation of the policy is delegated to NHSBT which is
given guidelines as to when requests may be granted or refused (usually
on the grounds of greater clinical priority elsewhere). The need for com-
pliancewith the law, uniform application acrossthewhole of the UK, and
full understanding by families of the unconditional nature of organ
donation is speciﬁcally emphasised. An advisory panel, with members
available for consultation at all times, is also established. Although the
new policy does introduce some latitude of decision for NHSBT, in
cases such as that of Laura Ashworth, the HTA’s statement regarding
law and policy and its central principle of unconditionality remain intact.
The position, therefore, appears both clear and resolved. But, is the
law really as settled as the HTA contends? In fact, a careful survey of
the fundamentals of organ donation law casts doubt on all its assump-
tions. It will be claimed below that the 2004 Act does not forbid con-
ditional or directed deceased donations, but appears to allow for them
in its statutory codes of practice. We will argue that the transplanting
of an organ contrary to the terms of a lawful condition is an offence
punishable under section 5 of the 2004 Act. We will show that the
HTA has no power to vary the words of the Act—its authority is
limited to guidance. We will submit that there is no law that requires
organs to be distributed only through NHSBT ODT. In fact, with or
without attached conditions or directions, they may be transplanted
at units throughout the country without any breach of the 2004 Act,
provided that they are otherwise lawful. The HTA has no power to
prevent such operations. NHSBT ODT’s principle of unconditional
donation is certainly lawful, but amounts only to an operational
policy. It is entitled to reject conditional donations, but not to vary or
53 Requested allocation of a deceased donor organ ,www.dh.gov.uk/en/
Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/
DH_114800.. The document was developed and agreed by all UK Health
Administrations, together with the HTA and NHSBT.
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2004 Act.
III. THE GIFT OF LIFE: PROPERTY OR A MATTER OF
CONSENT?
The traditional legal rule has been that the human body cannot be a
property. At common law, it is well established that there can be no
property in a corpse.
54 This means that a body or body parts
cannot generally be stolen.
55 This principle has come under increasing
scrutiny in recent years
56 as a result of growing scientiﬁc, medical, and
possible commercial
57 and criminal considerations.
58 In R v Kelly,
59
the Court of Criminal Appeal held that body parts (in that instance, ana-
tomical specimens) could acquire the attributes of property for the pur-
poses of section 4 of the Theft Act 1968 if skilled work had been
performed on them. According to Rose LJ, ‘the common law does not
stand still. It may be that if, on some future occasion, the question
arises, the courts will hold that human body parts are capable of being
property for the purposes of section 4, even without the acquisition of
different attributes, if they have a use or signiﬁcance beyond their mere
existence. This may be so if, for example, they are intended for use in
an organ transplant operation’.
60 This statement carries the suggestion
that the unlawful misappropriation of a donor organ might in future
be perceived as theft. Indeed, it may be that only the absence of any
legal challenge to the ‘unconditional donation’ principle has prevented
that conclusion from being drawn already by the courts.
In R v Kelly, the preparation of body parts as anatomical specimens
was held to be a sufﬁcient act of skill to give them status as property.
61
It is difﬁcult to see why the same status would not be applied to organs
54 Dr Handyside’s case (1749) 3 East PC 652; Williams v Williams (1852) 20
Ch D 657.
55 See R Hardcastle, Law and the Human Body (Hart Publishing, Oxford,
2007).
56 P Matthews, ‘The Man of Property’ (1995 Autumn) 3 Med Law Rev 251–
274. See also R Nwabueze, ‘Donated Organs, Property Rights and the Reme-
dial Quagmire’ (2008 Summer) 16 Med Law Rev 201–224, and K Mason
and G Laurie, ‘Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body and Its Parts
in the Shadow of Bristol and Alder Hey’ (2001) 64 MLR 710–729.
57 See Moore v University of California793 PD 479 (Cal 1990); and generally B
Dickens, ’Living Tissue and Organ Donors and Property Law: More on
Moore’ (1992) Spring J Contemp Health L Pol’y 73–95.
58 R v Kelly [1998] 3 All ER 741, 750. See also Report of Nufﬁeld Council on
Bioethics, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (1995) 9.10–10.6. www.
nufﬁeldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/humantissue/publication_298.html
59 Kelly (n 58).
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
286 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2010]donated for clinical transplantation. Extensive skills have been applied
to them to make them suitable for transplantation. These include not
only surgical removal and preparation, perfusion with preserving ﬂuid
and sterile cold storage, but also the establishment of recipient compat-
ibility by means of tissue typing and cross-matching procedures. None
of these ‘high tech’ activities appears inferior in skill to the fairly
routine methods considered sufﬁcient by the court in R v Kelly to estab-
lish property in body parts. In the (not impossible) event of an uncondi-
tionally donated organ being snatched from NHSBT ODT for the
purpose of organ trafﬁcking, it seems likely that the perpetrator could
be convicted of theft in the same way as the defendants in R v Kelly.
To take the case further, therefore, if an organ allocation body
removed a donated organ from the possession of a retrieval team
knowing it to be subject to some restriction (e.g. transplantation into
a local resident), the stage could be set for prosecution, not only
under the 2004 Act, but also under the Theft Act.
The Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Yearworth v North Bristol
NHS Trust,
62 a case which concerned men whose stored sperm
samples had been made unusable by avoidable thawing, shows a
broader common law acceptance of property rights in general,
accompanied by remarks that new (bio)technology demands a more
reasoned response from the common law. In Yearworth, the Court of
Appeal based its decision on the concept that, for the purposes of com-
pensation for negligence, the claimants’ rights over the sperm were
essentially those of ownership. While that case concerned living
persons and ‘damage to’ rather than ‘loss of’ materials, the court’s state-
ments seem to imply that if the required application of human skill has
occurred, then, whatever the position as regards theft, materials
intended for transplant might also be capable of being considered as
property. If that were really so, one might argue that such materials
could, in theory, escape penalties from the offence relating to commer-
cial dealings in the 2004 Act. This would be because although section 32
of the 2004 Act expressly prohibits transplantation for proﬁt, section
32(9) also expressly excludes ‘material which is the subject of property
because of an application of human skill’. But this argument and
interpretation, however, improperly conﬂates property with tradabil-
ity.
63 One can quite properly and coherently own something which
one may nevertheless not trade.
64 Without substantive evidence, it
does not logically follow, from the possibility of commerciality, that
commodiﬁcation is in fact legitimate, nor that it can be properly
62 [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2009] All ER (D) 33 (Feb).
63 Cronin and Price (n 7).
64 J Penner, The Idea of Property (OUP, Oxford 1997).
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transplantation.
65 However, the above decisions and judicial state-
ments, and this analysis, do highlight a growing uncertainty and ambi-
guity as to the legal status of human materials, which can probably only
be resolved by statute.
IV. CONDITIONAL AND DIRECTED DONATIONS PRIOR TO
THE 2004 ACT: NO INHERENT ILLEGALITY
The concept of a body part as property has never been directly con-
sidered in the sphere of organ donation. In this context, it appears, as
far as the law is concerned, that ‘donation’ of an organ is not a true
gift but merely a consent to the process of organ retrieval and transplan-
tation. Although it is not possible to compel acceptance of a donation or
any attached condition, no rule of common law prohibits the transplan-
tation of organs into designated recipients, especially if this is done with
the consent of those having the duty to dispose of the body—normally
the deceased’s personal representatives.
66 Conversely, the transplan-
tation of a body part without consent, or contrary to any condition or
direction, has appeared unlikely to lead to any liability at common
law,
67 at any rate in the earlier years of transplantation before more
recent decisions and judicial statements had lent credence to the idea
that the application of human skill to a body part might be able to
confer some attribute of property upon it.
68
The main function of the Human Tissue Act 1961 (hereafter the 1961
Act) was to conﬁrm the lawful nature of organ donation with the
donor’s consent or without evidence of objection from the donor and/
or their relatives. It has been asserted that it did not envisage conditional
donation.
69 However, section 1(1) stated that following the donor’s
death ‘any part or, as the case may be, the speciﬁed part’ might be auth-
orised to be removed ‘for use in accordance with the request’ (authors’
italics). This does not preclude conditions or directions. In addition,
section 1(8) stated: ‘Nothing in this section shall be construed as render-
ing unlawful any dealing with, or with any part of, the body of a
deceased person which is lawful apart from this Act’. Thus, if con-
ditional and directed donations were not unlawful at common law,
they remained not unlawful after the 1961 Act.
70
65 Cronin and Price (n 7).
66 Williams v Williams (n 54).
67 Dobson v N. Tyneside Health Authority [1996] 4 All ER 474.
68 Kelly (n 58).
69 An Investigation into Conditional Donation (n 6), Ch 4.45.
70 It has been argued that civil liability might have ensued for non-compliance
with the 1961 Act. But no case was ever brought under it, and the authors
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ditions and directions, it imposed no speciﬁc sanctions for non-
compliance
71 and so contained nothing to inhibit the general accep-
tance of ‘unconditional’ donation policies. Indeed, there were a
number of clinical and ethical considerations which favoured these.
First, it was unlikely that a deceased donor would have been aware
of any person who could be designated as a recipient. Second, the
requirements of close tissue typing, negative cross-matching and,
especially, speed of allocation made it expedient to allow priority to
the organ-matching service, whether at local or at national level.
72
Conditions and directions were rare and merely added to an already
complicated and time-consuming process. Third, the concept of
organ donation as a gift to society was in keeping with the principles
of the National Health Service.
73 It had (and still has) considerable
public support.
74
In 1998, a case of attempted conditional deceased organ donation
produced widespread public controversy and led to government
intervention.
75 The condition, which required restriction of allo-
cation to white recipients only, circulated brieﬂy through the organ
allocation service before being discarded as contrary to its policy
of unconditional donation. Mr Frank Dobson, the then Secretary
of State for Health, made an immediate statement to the effect
that conditional donation was ‘completely unacceptable’,
76 followed
by a further statement (together with the President of the British
Transplantation Society) afﬁrming that ‘organs must not be accepted
if conditions about the recipient are attached’.
77 T h er e p o r to fa
specially appointed panel, ‘An Investigation into Conditional
Organ Donation’, appeared in 2000.
78 Although most of its con-
clusions used the word ‘unacceptable’, rather than ‘illegal’, it did
appear to concede that the absence of sanctions would have excluded crim-
inal liability. See Mason and McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics,J K
Mason and GT Laurie (eds) (7th edn OUP, Oxford 2006) s 14.38, p 493.
71 See ‘Legal Regulation of the Use of Human Material’ in McHale JV and Fox
M, Health Care Law (2
nd edn Sweet and Maxwell 2007) 1100–1101.
72 See, for example, YC Zhou and JM Cecka, ‘Preservation’ in Clinical Trans-
plants 1992 (UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, Los Angeles 1993) 203.
73 National Health Service Act 1977, s 1(1).
74 J Neuberger and D Mayer, ‘Conditional Organ Donation: the Views of the
UK General Public Findings of an Ipsos-Mori Poll’ (2008) 85 Transplantation
1545–1547.
75 An Investigation into Conditional Organ Donation (n 6).
76 ‘Dobson: “No health apartheid”’ ,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/
387817.stm..
77 Ibid. Cf. Maclean (n 52).
78 An Investigation into Conditional Organ Donation (n 6).
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to be:
(i) The Human Tissue Act 1961 ‘did not envisage conditional agree-
ment. Either the donor ...agrees to a part of his, or her, body
being used for donation after death, or they do not’.
(ii) There is no duty on a potential donor ‘to agree to the use of their
organs after death, however offensive or irrational the reasons for
refusing to do so’
(iii) ‘Racist’ conditions, if wrongly accepted by the NHS, must be
ignored, and the organ used for the most suitable recipient, irre-
spective of race, since otherwise there may be a breach of the
Race Relations Act 1976. But
(iv) ‘If an organ has been inadvertently accepted with a racist condition
attached, the fact that that the condition cannot be put into effect
does not invalidate the agreement to donate for the purposes of
the 1961 Act. The organ can still be used’.
79
The panel’s ﬁnal conclusions mirrored those of the Secretaryof State. All
conditional donations were unacceptable. Chapter 6.9 of the report rec-
ommended that the policyof unconditional donation should now be for-
malised, making it clear that ‘it applies to all conditions and not just
those of a racist kind, and that the opportunity should be taken to set
out what the law requires in this area’.
80
The report thus reinforced the idea that all deceased conditional
donations must be illegal. But, while some of the panel’s legal surmises
were correct (e.g. that there is no duty to donate organs to the NHS
under UK law), others were not. In particular, as seen, nothing in the
1961Actprecludedconditionaldonationsandthefreedomtoignorecon-
ditions was not an effect of that Act, but merely a reﬂection of its lack of
sanctions.Inaddition,thereportfailedtotakeaccountofthefactthatthe
UK organ-sharing schemewasthen (and remainsstill, rightlyor wrongly)
a matter of cooperation rather than compulsion. Individual units were
free to pursue their own deceased organ donation policies, provided
that the general law was respected—under the 1961 Act, as seen, this
wasnotdifﬁcult. In theyearsbefore the2004 Act,it was possible forcon-
ditional or directed kidney donations to be performed locally if local
opportunity and policy allowed it, as the national organ-sharing policies
allowed local units to retain one kidney for use at their discretion.
81
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid, ch 6.9. Emphasis added.
81 UKTAllocation Protocol 2003. See SV Fuggle and others, ‘Human Leucocyte
Antigen and the Allocation of Kidneys from Cadaver Donors in the United
Kingdom’ (2007) 77 Transplantation 618–620.
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general law has never been tested in the courts. One clear case would
be a donation for reward. Parties to such a procedure would face prose-
cution
82; and others can be envisaged. The condition attempted in the
1998 case (restriction to a racial group) appears prima facie illegal, as
amounting to discrimination under the race relations legislation.
83
However, the position may be more complex than suspected. While
the organ allocation body was free to reject the donation as infringing
its policy, the Race Relations Act 1976 did not, in 1998, extend to dis-
crimination by public bodies (introduced by the Race Relations
(Amendment) Act 2000). In addition, section 35 of the 1976 Act
states: ‘nothing ...shall render unlawful any act...affording persons of
a particular racial group access to facilities or services to meet the
special needs of persons of that group in regard to their education, train-
ing or welfare ...’ (authors’ italics). NHSBTODT’s allocation policy cur-
rently gives preference to recipients with blood groups and tissue typing
commonly found among ethnic minorities. The reason is that due to a
lower donation rate among such communities, combined with a higher
incidence of renal failure, access to deceased donor transplantation is
otherwise difﬁcult.
84 This form of ‘covert’ discrimination is outlawed
by section 1(b) of the 1976 Act,
85 although it may be protected either
bysection 35 or by the claim (section 1(b)(ii)) that it is justiﬁable irrespec-
tive ofracial origin. However,ifthisislawful,itisunclearwhya donation
in favour of any other ethnic group, overt or covert, should not also be
protected.
To summarise the position prior to the 2004 Act, the dominant role of
the organ allocation body, backed by the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ of
individual units to abide by its policies, the unenforceability of con-
ditions under the common law, the purely permissive nature of the
1961 Act, unsupported by sanctions for non-compliance, the dislike
of the government and allocation authority for conditional donations,
82 Human Tissue Act 2004 s 32 (formerly Human Organ Transplants Act 1989
s 1).
83 Race Relations Act 1976 s 1.
84 UKT Allocation Protocol 2003. See Fuggle and others (n 81). Ethnic min-
orities (who have a high incidence of blood group B) comprised 22% of
the UK transplant waiting list, but only 2% of deceased organ donors. In
2002, by allowing certain organs from blood group O donors to be allocated
to blood group B recipients, an increased donation rate for this group was
achieved, to the disadvantage of the blood group O recipients (mainly
white) who would otherwise have received them.
85 And more speciﬁcally by s 1A, inserted (19 July 2003) by the Race Relations
Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1626). These expressly
apply to health care.
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courts combined to produce the following assumptions:
(a) The acceptance policy represented the law. Therefore,
(b) conditional and directed donations were inherently unlawful; and
(c) such donations could be allocated unconditionally, as if the
attempted restrictions did not exist.
These assumptions were those of the report of the Investigation
into Conditional Donation of 2000. But, they were incorrect.
They accurately reﬂected the policy of the allocation body, but received
no support from either common law or statute.
V. THE HUMAN TISSUE ACT 2004: THE PRIMACY AND
VALIDITY OF ‘APPROPRIATE CONSENT’
In 2000, the former allocation body, the United Kingdom Transplant
Support Service Agency (UKTSSA), a Special Health Authority set up
in 1991, was replaced by UKT whose remit included an obligation
actively to promote organ donation.
86 No alteration in policy or law
resulted: but a change in the legal status of all donations was about to
take place. The 2004 Act, which repeals and replaces earlier legis-
lation,
87 signiﬁcantly altered the law. Organ donation now became
unlawful, except under deﬁned circumstances. The main relevant new
rules are as follows:
(1) The 2004 Act permits authorised activities for certain scheduled
purposes to be carried out. The 2004 Act covers seven scheduled
purposes requiring general consent, one of which is
transplantation.
88
(2) Authorised activities are only lawful if done with ‘appropriate
consent’.
89
(3) Unauthorised dealings are now criminal offences, carrying
penalties.
90
(4) A regulatory body, the HTA, has been set up to oversee and control
the working of the Act.
91
(5) Codes of practice
92 establish guidelines for practice, especially as
regards the meaning and extent of ‘appropriate consent’. It is thus
86 ,http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/newsroom/fact_sheets/pdfs/
about_us_0209.pdf..
87 Human Tissue Act 2004 (n 1).
88 Ibid, s 1.
89 Ibid, s 3.
90 Ibid, s 5.
91 Ibid, Part 2 s 13–15.
92 Ibid, s 26.
292 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2010]essential to know the precise meaning of ‘appropriate consent’ since
otherwise criminal liability may be incurred.
93
How do these changes affect conditional or directed deceased
donations? Two important principles are unchanged. First, NHSBT
ODT’s policy is unaffected—it remains free to reject conditional or
directed donations. Secondly, there is still no compulsion for donated
organs to be allocated solely according to NHSBT ODT’s policies—
alternative arrangements remain possible, provided that they do not
contravene the terms of the 2004 Act. The most important change
stems from the application of the new principle of ‘appropriate
consent’ to the declared policy of discarding attempted conditions and
directions in favour of unconditional allocations.
94
‘Appropriate consent’ requirements for adults fall under section 3 of
the 2004 Act. No distinction is made between consent for the purpose of
tissue retention and that for organ donation. Although, in several
deﬁned situations, proxy consent is legal under the 2004 Act,
95 here
we will examine only the position of a deceased adult donor who had
been competent to give or withhold consent in person, because the
same principles of interpretation apply in each situation. Section 3(6)
states:
Where the person concerned” (the donor) “has died ...‘appropri-
ate consent’ means
(a) if a decision of his to consent to the activity, or a decision of his not
to consent to it, was in force immediately before he died, his
consent.
In 2006, the HTA issued a Code of Practice regarding consent,
96 after it
had been approved by Parliament. Although the Codes are important
and intended to be inﬂuential, section 28 of the 2004 Act states that
failure to comply with their provisions does not, of itself, render a
person liable to legal proceedings. In view of the HTA’s express rejection
of the legality of conditional donations, one might expect the Code to
have reinforced this position. But, in fact, para 105 states;
93 Ibid, s 3.
94 Human Tissue Authority statement (n 47).
95 For children (s 2), for persons without legal capacity (s 6), by nominated
representatives (s 4) and, in the absence of consent, by persons in a ‘qualifying
relationship’ (ss 3.8 and 27 (4)).
96 Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice on Consent (Code 1, July 2006)—
speciﬁcally required by s 26(3). This code should now be considered in con-
junction with the Revised Codes of Practice, Donation of Solid Organs for
Transplantation issued by the HTA in September 2009.
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– General, i.e. if someone consents to the use of tissue for research, it
need not be limited to a particular object
– Speciﬁc, i.e. a person limits their consent – a sample can only be
used for research into a particular condition
– Both general and speciﬁc, i.e. a general consent subject to speciﬁc
exceptions.
It is true that the examples given by the 2006 Code seem to refer to cases
of proposed tissue retention for research: but both the 2004 Act and the
Code make it clear that, in section 3, ‘general provision is made for
adults to consent to the use of their material for a range of purposes,
including research and organ transplantation’.
97 If consent is not
required to be unrestricted, or ‘generic’
98 in the context of donations
for research, the same must apply to consent for deceased organ
donation for transplantation since neither the 2004 Act nor the Codes
make any distinction as to the nature of the consent involved in these
two situations. In 2009, a Revised Code of Practice not only restated
the difference between generic and speciﬁc consent but also emphasised
that it should be valid, i.e. given voluntarily by an ‘appropriately
informed’ and competent person.
99
It may be argued that ‘appropriate consent’ in section 3 of the 2004
Act must be read in the light of Parliament’s true intention (which, in
keeping with the central principle of the HTA and UKT (now NHSBT
ODT), must have been to ensure that restrictions on deceased donations
should be illegal) and interpreted accordingly. But, this does not survive
analysis. The basic principle of statutory interpretation is that the inten-
tion of Parliament ‘has to be ascertained from the words which it has
used and those words are to be construed according to their plain and
ordinary meaning’.
100 An interpretation of consent which overrides
any attached restrictions is hardly in such a category. The plain fact is
that the 2004 Act is completely silent on conditional and directed
deceased donations
101 and cannot be construed so as to appear to
provide for them. Furthermore, this argument offends the principle
97 McHale and Fox (n 71) 1100, 1131.
98 On the objections to generic consent as a negation of donor autonomy or
possible religious and cultural objections, see McHale and Fox (n 71)
1127. See also JV McHale, ‘Regulating Genetic Databases: Some Legal and
Ethical Issues’ (2004) 11 Med Law Rev 70.
99 Revised Code of Practice 2, Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation
issued by the HTA in September 2009 paras 30–34.
100 Pickstone v Freeman [1989] AC 61, (Lord Oliver).
101 See Cronin and Price (n 7). See also McHale and Fox (n 71) at 1100,
1128–29.
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other than by express words or necessary implication.
102 At common
law, a party’s consent, given without the knowledge that his or her
attached conditions will be ignored, amounts to uninformed consent,
as it is ‘expressed in form only, not in reality’
103 and so may be held
to have been vitiated.
104 The HTA’s Revised Code of Practice 1,
Consent (2009) actively stresses the need for consent to be informed if
it is to be valid.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROCEEDING WITHOUT
VALID CONSENT
The conclusion from this interpretation of consent is clear but discon-
certing. If a donor’s consent has been limited to speciﬁc situations, it
followsthat anyallocation of organs contrary to such limitations vitiates
that consent and amounts to dealing with the organs without consent.
Although it appears that NHSBT ODT (or any other organ user)
remains free to reject such donations as contrary to its allocation
policy, NHSBT ODT is not free to accept the donation while ignoring
the restriction. The conclusion of the Investigation into Conditional
Donation in 2000 can no longer be followed with impunity, despite
the HTA’s recent statement on the directed donation case.
105 To do so
would be an offence under section 5 of the Act. It has been argued
already that conditional and directed donations have never been
illegal per se, as they are not prohibited by any law. But, even if a restric-
tion were held to be illegal (e.g. under the Race Relations Acts), it does
not follow that it could then be disregarded for the purposes of estab-
lishing consent to unconditional donation. On the contrary, like any
other qualiﬁcation, it would tend to vitiate the donor’s consent,
raising the prospect of criminal liability as a result.
In ignoring the donor’s intentions and allocating organs uncondition-
ally, a number of persons and bodies could become liable to prosecution
under section 5 of the 2004 Act. The teams directly involved in the
donation and transplantation activity are obvious candidates.
However, although strict liability under statute is always a possibility,
the terms of section 5(1), which requires a ‘guilty mind’, offers them a
defence. This states that a person will not be liable if he ‘reasonably
believes...that he does the activity with appropriate consent’. Although
all persons are presumed to be cognisant of the law, the fact that the
102 R v Home Secretary ex parte Simms [2000] AC 115, 1131 (Lord Hoffman).
103 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257.
104 Chatterton v Gerson (n 104) (Bristow J).
105 Human Tissue Authority statement (n 47).
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NHSBT ODT and the policy statement of the HTA (even though wrong)
appears to protect them. Next in line is NHSBT ODT (as the allocating
authority) which, while not directly involved under section 5(1), is
covered by section 5(2) which states:
‘A person commits an offence if
(a) he falsely represents to a person whom he knows or believes is going
to, or may, do an activity...
(i) that there is appropriate consent to the doing of the activity, or
(ii) that the activity is not one to which the subsection applies, and
(b) he knows that the representation is false or does not believe it to be
true’.
However, as NHSBTODTand its agents also have a reasonable (though
wrong) belief in the correctness of the HTA pronouncements, they too
are probably (though less clearly) immune from liability.
The ﬁnal candidate is the HTA itself.
106 It is a statutory corpor-
ation
107 whose remit
108 and functions
109 include both the maintenance
of the general principles that it considers should be followed and the
provision of oversight and guidance for those involved in organ
donation and transplantation. Undoubtedly capable of criminality
110
even if a guilty mind is required,
111 its statement of 14 April 2008
identiﬁes it as potentially liable for the purposes of section 5(2).
112
Could it, however, rely on its erroneous, but honest, misinterpretation
of the law in that statement as a defence? In our opinion it cannot.
While the clinical teams and NHSBT ODT are protected by their
reliance on its advice, which they reasonably regard as authoritative,
the HTA itself has no such bulwark and cannot plead misunderstanding
of the law any more than any other defendant. Although we have
no wish to see it prosecuted, we contend that the errors in its policy
statement, if put into effect in a case of directed deceased donation,
106 Although the HTA’s agents could in theory be personally liable under s 5(2)
of the 2004 Act, the delegated nature of their work and the central identiﬁ-
cation of the HTA with the policy statement of 14 April 2008 (n 4) make it
unnecessary to consider their position here.
107 Human Tissue Act 2004, s 13.
108 Ibid, s 14.
109 Ibid, s 15.
110 The option of a ﬁne as penalty under s 5(7) of the 2004 Act reinforces this
position.
111 See Kite (Peter Bayliss) [1996] 2 Cr App R (S) 295, CA 249.
112 See Tesco Supermarkets v Nattras [1972] AC 153.
296 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2010]would inevitably place the ﬁnal liability upon the regulatory authority
itself.
113
It may be argued that in the Laura Ashworth case, the HTA did not, in
fact, commit any offence because the donor’s intention should be con-
strued as merely to give priority to her mother, with a more general
consent to unconditional donation if that should prove clinically
impossible. However, such an intention would need to have been pre-
sented immediately before death
114 and could not lawfully be con-
structed later in the light of what appeared clinically desirable. In
addition, the HTA’s ofﬁcial statement conﬁrms its intention to continue
ignoring such conditions for the time being, leaving it at risk of prosecu-
tion in future cases.
115 A somewhat analogous argument regarding con-
struing a donor’s intention was advanced by Alasdair Maclean in 1999
with respect to the ‘racial condition’ donation of 1998.
116 Maclean
suggests that a distinction between conditions precedent to a donation,
which formed part of it and could not be separated from it, and con-
ditions subsequent which, being attached as an afterthought to a ‘gift’
which was already unconditional, should be properly disregarded.
Although ingenious, this argument appears to be a contrived attempt
to arrive at an ethically acceptable solution that does not sit easily
with the rules of statutory interpretation.
The policy document ‘Requested Allocation of a Deceased Donor
Organ’
117 requires (para 20) that, in discussing requests, it is vital
that family members should understand that, although requests can
be considered in certain circumstances, donation must never be con-
ditional on the requested allocation going ahead. This raises an interest-
ing point on consent. If the family, after discussion, voluntarily agrees
to make the donation unconditional, a subsequent decision by NHSBT
not to allow the request (e.g. because of an alternative high priority
recipient) would appear to be lawful. But if, as seems more likely in
view of NHSBT’s misunderstanding of the law, the family acquiesces
in the unconditionality only because it mistakenly believes that it has
no other choice, its consent would be vitiated by this misinformation
and as a result any failure to honour the request would become illegal.
113 In general, there is a tendency for the courts to be lenient. For two opposing
cases, see Sec of State for Trade and Industry v Hart [1982] WLR 481 and
Grant v Bond [1982] WLR 638. But since neither of these cases involved a
statutory body, it is not clear what view the courts might take of breaches of
the law mistakenly committed by members of such bodies.
114 Human Tissue Act 2004, s 3(6).
115 Human Tissue Authority statement (n 47).
116 Maclean (n 52).
117 Requested allocation of a deceased donor organ (n 53).
Med. L. Rev. Directed Deceased Donor Organ Donation 297Supporters of the HTA’s ‘unconditional’ policy might further argue
that, even if not strictly prohibited in law, directed and conditional
donations cannot take place in practice, since, even if it is an offence
under the 2004 Act to overrule them, NHSBT ODT is nevertheless
under no obligation to give effect to them and, in deference to its
central principle, apparently will not do so. As a result, these attempted
donations simply will not happen. This argument would have a con-
siderable weight if non-compliance with NHSBT ODT’s allocation pol-
icies were an offence or subject to sanctions, as in the USA, where under
the National Organ Transplant Act 1984 (NOTA), failure to comply
with the statutory policies of the Organ Procurement and Transplant
Network (OPTN)
118 may lead to exclusion from the Medicare and
Medicaid programmes, as well as to other penalties.
119 But in the UK,
because, as already shown, deceased donations without reference to
NHSBT ODT appear to incur no legal sanctions (although they might
attract the disapproval of the HTA), it would be possible for any trans-
plant centre to step in and give effect to an otherwise lawful directed or
conditional donation on its own initiative, rather than lose a rare, and
clinically vital, opportunity for the recipient. This would not lessen
the overall importance of NHSBT ODT, whose co-operation for the
majority of donations (which are, by their nature, unconditional) is
essential. It would only be likely to apply in circumstances in which
the ‘unconditional’ policy of NHSBT ODT and the HTA conﬂicted
with an (equally lawful) ‘discretionary’ approach on the part of the
local unit.
It is interesting to note that in the USA, although compliance with
OPTN’s policies is mandatory, its powers of enforcement are combined
with considerable freedom to devise ‘equitable’ allocation policies. The
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) expressly provides that ‘Nothing in
this section shall prohibit the allocation of an organ to a recipient named
by those authorised to make the donation’.
120 In addition, the US
Uniform Anatomical Organ Gift Acts from 1968 to 2006, which
provide the authority for deceased organ donation, also permit
donations to be made to speciﬁc individuals.
121 The condition is that
if the speciﬁed donation turns out to be impossible, the organ is to be
118 See National Organ Transplant Act, US Code, Title 42 ss 273–274 and
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 42 (Public Health) Subchapter K
121.1–11, 2005.
119 CFR 42 121.10(c), 2005. See SV McDiarmid and others, ‘The Oversight of
Solid Organ Transplantation in the United States’ (2008) 8 Am J Transplant
739–744.
120 CFR 42 121.4 and 121.8, 2005.
121 All the US states have adopted in their state laws one version or another of
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts.
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122 Thus, the American law leaves an
opening for personal autonomy under reasonable circumstances,
123
while still retaining an underlying ethic of impartial justice. The Amer-
ican laws appear to provide for a degree of discretion very similar to that
which the HTA, in its statement on the Ashworth case, seemed to con-
sider desirable for itself—if only it were not bound by the law. Some-
what ironically, our analysis shows that it is not so bound and already
possesses that discretion. There is also evidence to suggest that public
opinion in the UK would not be hostile to its exercise in suitable
situations.
124
The above interpretation of the 2004 Act could have further conse-
quences. As it does not prohibit conditional or directed donations,
and these are not illegal per se, it could be possible for donors to
bypass NHSBT ODT’s national allocation policy by requiring their
organs to be used only in their own locality or NHS Region. Although
unlikely to become a reality under the current system of close
co-operation, it might well attract signiﬁcant widespread public
support
125 if, for instance, severe organ donor shortage and increased
regional ‘devolutionary’ tendencies were to coincide. Such conditions
or directions would have to be accepted by both NHSBTand local trans-
plant units or else rejected completely, on pain of criminal liability—
with the legally permissible, but socially and clinically deplorable, the
result that the organs would be unused unless the donor immediately
before death had agreed that local recipients should have priority
only. Another result could be a strengthening of the concept of property
in organs, as already discussed, because the unconditional national allo-
cation of an organ by the authority in deﬁance of a donor’s directions
for local or regional allocation might raise the possibility of its being
prosecuted for theft.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The reinforcement by statute of the legal status of conditional and
directed donations has come about unnoticed, as there is no evidence
122 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 2006 ss 11(b) and 11(g)(3).
123 We would like to acknowledge the help of Mr Ronald Richenburg, Principal
Assistant Librarian, Bodleian Law Library, Oxford University in accessing
this information.
124 J Neuberger and D Mayer (n 74). In a representative quota sample of 2015
adults (aged 15 years and over), there was a wide spread of opinion. While
60% of respondents, in general, favoured unconditional donation, some
conditions had signiﬁcant support—e.g. priority to children (59%), exclu-
sion of alcoholics from liver donation (39%), and priority to family (36%).
125 Neuberger and Mayer (n 124).
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126 How can that be? There
are a number of possible reasons.
(1) It has not been appreciated how little legal regulation existed before
the 2004 Act. In particular, the inchoate nature of the common law
meant that little or nothing had been decided on the legality of
donation and the nature of consent. It was not realised, for
example, that since conditional or directed consent was not inher-
ently illegal it must be lawful unless forbidden.
(2) The purely permissive nature of the Human Tissue Act 1961 and its
lack of sanctions for non-compliance allowed UKT (now NHSBT
ODT) to operate a policy of unconditional donation which was
widely, but wrongly, assumed to represent the law. But, in the
absence of any law compelling donation to (now) NHSBT ODT,
individual units remained free to follow any lawful donation policy.
(3) The stance taken by the government following the 1998 ‘racial’
donation inhibited consideration of donations which, although
restricted in some way, might be ethically acceptable.
(4) The rarity and clinical inconvenience of such donations meant that
very little thought was given to them;
(5) The Report of the Investigation into Conditional Donation 2000
127
had the opportunity to analyse the true legal position, but discarded
it in favour of asserting the NHS policy as if it were established law;
(6) The drafting decision to require the same deﬁnition of ‘appropriate
consent’ in both organ donation and tissue retention had the impor-
tant, though unintended, consequence of creating legislative support
for the concept that consent for deceased organ donation need not
be unrestricted.
(7) The rarity of any legal challenge to the policies of the NHS and its
statutory bodies (let alone any successful one) has discouraged
analysis of their legality, which tend to be followed unquestioningly
even when those bodies themselves are not satisﬁed with their
application. This legally unnecessary assumption of subordination
appears both in the attitude of ULTRA to its authority under the
HOTAct 1989 and in the comments of the HTA after the Ashworth
case.
In spite of the inﬂuence of all these factors, it remains surprising that the
HTA should be so mistaken about the nature and limitations of its auth-
ority that it runs the risk of becoming criminally liable under its own
enabling statute criminally liable under its own enabling statute.
126 See D Price, ‘The Human Tissue Act 2004’ (2005) 68 MLR 798–821, 812.
127 An Investigation into Conditional Organ Donation (n 6).
300 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2010]Perhaps the best explanation is that the huge proliferation of statutes,
regulations, codes of practice, guidelines, ministerial pronouncements,
etc. in this area of NHS practice (as in others) has, in many minds,
blurred the distinction between law and policy. In addition, the ‘mono-
polistic’ authority of the NHS may act as a disincentive to constructive
criticism—an undesirable situation, if true. But penalties, while creating
new perils, have also brought about one unforeseen change. Whatever
the ethical arguments for or against them, conditions and directions
attached to deceased donations, though unenforceable, cannot simply
be ignored. As long as the present statutory framework of consent and
authorisation persists as the basis upon which deceased donor organs
become available for clinical transplantation, they must be taken
account of in establishing the validity of ‘appropriate consent’. More-
over, because they are not inherently illegal, there is no (lawful)
reason why they should not be put into effect, at discretion, in appropri-
ate circumstances, if otherwise lawful. This conclusion appears to chime
with some public opinion and does not seem to be unwelcome to the
HTA. But, in a wider perspective, the situation is disturbing, for it
suggests that the intrusion of government into the world of organ
donation and transplantation has been accompanied by a signiﬁcant
degree of incomprehension and that thosewho administer the transplant
laws do not fully understand their consequences.
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